Judgments Rendered In 1999 By The International Criminal Tribunals For The Former Yugosalvia And For Rwanda: Tadic (App.Ch.); Aleksovski (icty); Jelisic (Icty); Ruzindana & Kayishema (Ictr); Serushago (Ictr); Rutaganda (ictr) by Askin, Kelly D.
JUDGMENTS RENDERED IN 1999 BY THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS FOR
THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND FOR RWANDA:
TADIO- (APP. CH.); ALEKSOVSKI (ICTY); JELISIC
(ICTY); RUZINDANA & KAYISHEMA (ICTR);
SERUSHAGO (ICTR); RUTAGANDA (ICTR)
Kelly D. Askin*
I. THE APPEALS CHAMBER ................. ............ 487
II. 1999 APPEALS CHAMBER JUDGMENTS: TADIC JUDGEMENT .. 487
A. Tadid's Appeal Against Judgment .................. 488
1. Inequality ofArms .......................... 488
2. Appeal of Conviction for the Murder of Two
Policemen .............................. 489
B. Cross-Appeals by the OTP ....................... 490
1. Grave Breaches and "Protected Persons" .. ....... 490
2. Insufficient Evidence as to the Killings in Jaskid .. 491
3. Crimes Against Humanity - Purely Personal
M otives ................................... 492
4. Crimes Against Humanity - Discriminatory Intent . 492
5. Disclosure of Defense Witness Statements ....... 493
C. Sunmary ...................................... 494
11. 1999 ICTY Trial Chamber Judgments ................... 495
C. Aleksovski Judgement .......................... 495
B. The Jelisidc udgement ........................... 499
IV. 1999 ICTR TRIAL CHAMBER JUDGMENTS ................ 500
A. Serushago Sentence ............................. 500
B. Kayishema & Ruzindana Judgement ................ 500
1. Genocide ................................. 501
2. Crimes Against Humanity .................... 502
3. Violations of Common Article 3 and
Additional Protocol I ....................... 502
4. Legal Findings ............................. 503
C. Rutaganda Judgement ........................... 504
* This is an expanded and slightly different version of an article published by the Center for
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Washington College of Law, American University, in Kelly D. Askin,
News From the International Criminal Tribunals, 6(4) HUM. RTS. BRIEF 6 (1999).
486 ILSA Journal of international & Comparative Law [Vol. 6:485
The year of 1999 witnessed extensive activity in the two United Nations
ad hoc Tribunals established to prosecute serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and in
Rwanda. By the end of 1999, the three Trial Chambers of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (hereinafter "ICTY")' had handed
down six judgments (five after trials on the merits2 and one sentencing judg-
ment after a guilty plea'). Two of these judgments (the Aleksovski Judgement
and the Jelisid Judgement) were rendered by an ICTY Trial Chamber in 1999.'
The three Trial Chambers of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (hereinafter "ICTR") s have handed down five judgments (three after
trials on the merits6 and two sentencing judgments after guilty pleas).7 Three
1. International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, UN Doc.
S/25704, annex (1993), reprinted in 32 ILM 1192 (1993).
2. Prosecutor v. Dufko Tadid, Opinion and Judgment, IT-94-I-T, May 7, 1997; Prosecutor v.
Zejnil Delalid et al., Judgement, IT-96-21-T, Nov. 16, 1998; Prosecutor v. Anto Furundlija, Judgement, IT-
95-17/1-T, Dec. 10, 1998; Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Judgement, IT-95-14/1-T, June 25, 1999;
Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic, Judgement, IT-95-10-T, Dec. 14, 1999.
Please note that this article will use either "Judgment" or "Judgement" consistent with the
official usage of the particular decision.
3. Prosecutor v. Dralen Erdemovid, Sentencing Judgement, IT-96-22-Tbis, March 5, 1998.
4. An extremely important 1999 achievement of the Yugoslavian Tribunal was the issuance of the
Milogevid et al. Indictment on May 24, 1999, bringing charges against Slobodan Milogevid and four other
top Serbian military and political leaders for alleged crimes committed in Kosovo between January and May
of 1999. The other Accused are Milan Milutinovid, Nikola gainovid, Dragoljub Ojdanic, and Vlajko
Stojiljkovid. Charged with personal and superior responsibility under 7(1) and 7(3) of the ICTY Statute (only
ainovid is charged exclusively under 7(1)) for violations of Articles 3 (violations of the laws or customs of
war, for murder) and 5 (crimes against humanity, for deportation, murder, and persecution) of the Statute,
the Accused are alleged to have planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in
a campaign of terror, violence, destruction, and massacres directed at Kosovo Albanian civilians.
Both Tribunals have several cases at various stages of the pretrial process; in addition to the
judgments, hundreds of decisions have been rendered in the form of orders or other decisions on motions
before the Trial and Appeals Chambers. Similarly, each Tribunal has added public indictments or joined or
amended existing indictments during the year. Due to the limited scope of this article, these other
indictments, decisions, or events will not be discussed here.
5. International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and
Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and
Rwandan Citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of
neighbouring States, between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994, SC Res. 955, annex, UN SCOR, 49th
Sess., Res. & Dec., at 15, UN Doc. S/INF/59 (1994), reprinted in 33 ILM 1602 (1994).
6. Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Judgement, ICTR-96-4-T,Sept. 2, 1998; Prosecutor v.
Clement Kayishema &Obed Ruzindana, Judgement, ICTR-95-1 -TMay 21, 1999; and Prosecutor v. Georges
Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda, Judgement, ICTR-96-3-T, Dec. 6, 1999.
7. Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, Judgement and Sentence, ICTR-97-23-T, Sept. 4, 1998;
Prosecutor v. Omar Serushago, Sentence, ICTR-98-39-S, Feb. 5, 1999.
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of these, the Kayishema and Ruzindana Judgement, the Rutaganda Judgement,
and the Serushago Sentence, were rendered by an ICTR Trial Chamber in 1999.
Also in 1999, the purportedly common Appeals Chamber8 handed down what
is apparently 9 the final judgment in the Tadidcase.'° The Appeals Chamber has
several cases and motions pending from both Tribunals.
I. THE APPEALS CHAMBER
According to the ICTY and ICTR Statutes, the Appeals Chamber hears
decisions appealed by persons convicted by either the ICTY or ICTR Trial
Chambers, or from the Prosecutor of an error on a question of law invalidating
the decision, or on an error of fact that has occasioned a miscarriage of justice.
It is also empowered, under the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, to review a
decision at the request of a state directly affected by an interlocutory decision
if such decision concerns issues of general importance to the Tribunal. After the
Tadid Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, it could also be said to have
established a precedent for hearing other appeals considered of general
importance to the Tribunal."
II. 1999 APPEALS CHAMBER JUDGMENTS: TADIC JUDGEMENT
On July 15, 1999, the Appeals Chamber rendered its Judgement in the
Tadid case, the first such decision discharged by the Appeals Chamber.
Because the Appeals Chamber is common to both the Yugoslavian and
Rwandan Tribunals, this decision has important implications for both Tribunals.
The Trial Chamber Judgment in Tadid had been handed down in the ICTY by
Trial Chamber II on May 7, 1997, finding the Accused guilty on nine counts,
guilty in part on two counts, and not guilty on twenty counts. Of these twenty
not-guilty verdicts, eleven of the counts were acquitted because a majority of
the Trial Chamber held that the grave breach charges brought under Article 2
of the Statute were inapplicable because it had not been proven that the victims
were protected persons, an element of the offence.
8. "Purportedly" because it has to date been made up exclusively ofjudges elected to the ICTY.
9. "Apparently" because it is unclear whether Tadid can file or has filed an appeal from the
Appeals Chamber's Judgement when it found him guilty on nine counts for which he was previously found
not guilty by the Trial Chamber. Such a right to appeal from an Appeals Chamber decision is not provided
for under the Statute or Rules.
10. Prosecutor v. Dufko Tadid, Judgement, IT-94-1-A, July 15, 1999.
11. while not explicitly provided for in the Statute or the Rules (since the appeal was lodged by
Tadid prior to his trial and conviction), the Appeals Chamber nevertheless determined it had authority to hear
an appeal by Tadid challenging the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. See Prosecutor v. Dugko Tadid a/k/a "Dule,"
Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, IT-94-I-AR72, Oct. 2, 1995, App.
Ch., at f 4-6, (seemingly basing its authority on "common sense," practicality, and the interests of justice).
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In its appeal against the Trial Chamber's Judgment, the Defense argued
that Tadid' s right to a fair trial was prejudiced because he was denied "equality
of arms" between the Prosecution and the Defense, due to the prevailing
circumstances in which the trial was conducted. It further asserted that the
Trial Chamber erred as to finding him guilty of the murders of two Muslim
policemen, Osman Didovid and Edin Begic. Leave to file an appeal concerning
conduct of his former counsel had been previously denied by the Appeals
Chamber, so these were the only two remaining appeals against the Judgment.
In the appeal against the Judgment, the Defense sought to have the guilty
verdicts set aside and a re-trial ordered. In the alternative, Tadid sought to have
the guilty verdicts, as to the two policemen, reversed and correspondingly, that
the sentence be reviewed.
Five cross-appeals were filed by the Office of the Prosecutor (hereinafter
"OTP"). Of the eleven not-guilty verdicts relating to grave breaches, seven
were appealed by the Prosecution, and in addition, two of the not guilty verdicts
were appealed in regards to murder charges alleging Tadi' s participation in the
killings in Jaskidi. There were thus a total of nine acquittals appealed by the
OTP in the first two cross-appeals. The three remaining cross-appeals
concerned questions of general importance to the work of the Tribunal: the OTP
challenged the Trial Chamber's determination that a crime against humanity
cannot be committed for purely personal reasons; it challenged the Trial
Chamber's finding that discriminatory intent is a required element of crimes
against humanity under Article 5 of the ICTY Statute; and it argued that a
majority of the Trial Chamber erred in a November 1996 decision denying a
Prosecution motion for production of defense witness statements, creating an
untenable precedent.
A. Tadie's Appeal Against Judgment
1. Inequality of Arms
The first ground of appeal by the Defense concerned a complaint that due
to circumstances disproportionately impacting the Accused's case (such as the
failure of the Republika Srpska to cooperate by securing witnesses) Tadid's
right to a fair trial was prejudiced because there was an inequality of arms
between the Prosecution and the Defense. Equality of arms - the principle that
"each party must have a reasonable opportunity to defend its interests 'under
conditions which do not place him at a substantial disadvantage vis-A-vis his
opponent ' - is guaranteed by the fundamental right to a fair trial, as embodied
in human rights instruments and Article 21(4)(b) of the ICTY Statute.
12. Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadid, Judgement, IT-94-1-A, July 15, 1999.
The Appeals Chamber decided that because of the Tribunal's limited
enforcement powers and its reliance on state cooperation, this principle must
be given a liberal interpretation in the ICTY. Additionally, noting that the
Chambers are empowered to issue any necessary orders, summonses,
subpoenas, warrants, and transfer orders to aid an investigation or effectuate a
trial, 3 the Appeals Chamber determined that a Chamber therefore, "shall
provide every practicable facility it is capable of granting under the Rules and
Statute when faced with a request by a party for assistance in presenting its
case."' 4 However, the Appeals Chamber noted that the Appellant/Defense was
not complaining that the Trial Chamber had not responded adequately to its
requests for assistance, and indeed it was uncontested that the Trial Chamber
took virtually all measures within its authority to assist the Defense when
requested and necessary. The Appellant had remained silent as to certain
difficulties encountered in defending its case, and then relied on the equality of
arms principle to complain not that the Trial Chamber had failed to assist it
when seized of a request to do so, but instead that Tadid did not receive a fair
trial because authorities in the Republika Srpska had not cooperated in securing
the attendance of certain witnesses. As such, the Appeals Chamber denied
Tadid's appeal on this ground, holding that the Appellant failed to establish that
he was denied equality of arms by the Trial Chamber.
2. Appeal of Conviction for the Murder of Two Policemen
The remaining ground of appeal by the Defense concerned a complaint
that an error of fact lead to a miscarriage of justice, and consequently, Tadid
should not have been convicted of the murder of two policemen. It was
uncontested that reasonableness is the standard to be used in determining
whether the Trial Chamber's factual finding should stand. In the appeal, Tadid
complained that he was convicted of these murders solely on the testimony of
one unreliable witness. Noting that the Trial Chamber Judges have the task of
hearing, assessing, and weighing the evidence presented at trial and must
necessarily be given a margin of deference to findings of fact reached by the
Trial Chamber, the Appeals Chamber concluded that the Appellant failed to
establish that the witness was suspect or that his testimony was inherently
implausible. Finding no merit to the claim that the Trial Chamber acted
unreasonably in relying on this testimony in finding that the Appellant killed
the two policemen, this basis of appeal was also rejected.
13. Id. at$ 52.
14. Id.
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B. Cross-Appeals by the OTP
Five cross-appeals were filed by the Office of the Prosecutor. The first
two concerned acquittals. The three remaining cross-appeals were not alleged
to have had a bearing on the verdicts or that an appeal laid under Article 25(1)
of the Statute. However, both sides agreed that the issues were matters of
general importance affecting the conduct of trials before the Tribunal and
therefore were deemed to merit the attention of the Appeals Chamber. Hence,
the Appeals Chamber pronounced its opinion in these matters.
1. Grave Breaches and "Protected Persons"
The first ground of cross-appeal by the OTP concerned the Trial
Chamber's finding that it had not been proven that the victims were "protected
persons" under Article 2 of the Statute (which gives the Tribunal jurisdiction
over grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions). For Article 2 to apply,
it must first be established that the nature of the conflict was at all relevant
times international in character, and second that the grave breach alleged was
perpetrated against persons or property "protected" by one or more of the 1949
Geneva Conventions. The Appeals Chamber noted that an internal armed
conflict may in certain situations become international if another state
intervenes in the conflict through its troops or if some of the participants in the
internal conflict act on behalf of another state.15 The Appeals Chamber found
that international law provides for applying three different tests to determine if
individuals or groups may be regarded as defacto organs of the state or agency:
1) a test of "overall control" to determine if the acts of armed groups can be
attributable to a state; 2) a test of "specific instructions (or subsequent public
approval)" to determine if individuals or militarily unorganized groups act on
behalf of states; and 3) a test of "assimilation of individuals to State organs on
account of their actual behavior within the structure of a State (and regardless
of any possible requirement of State instructions."' 6 After analyzing the facts,
the Appeals Chamber concluded that the armed forces of the Republika Srpska
were acting under the overall control of and on behalf of the FRY. Thus, "even
after May 19, 1992 the armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina between the
Bosnian Serbs and the central authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina must be
classified as an international armed conflict."'
' 7
In determining whether the victims were "protected persons," the Appeals
Chamber reasoned that the Fourth Geneva Convention was intended to protect
15. Id. at 84.
16. Id. at9 141.
17. Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadid, Judgement, 17-94-1-A, July 15, 1999.
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civilians to the maximum extent possible and to provide protection to civilians
who do not have diplomatic protection and who are "not subject to the
allegiance and control" of the state in whose hands they may find themselves,
and therefore, it is the substance of relations between the parties, not their legal
characterization, which is controlling. 8 In essence, under this criteria, it does
not matter if the victims (Bosnian Muslims and Croats) and perpetrator
(Bosnian Serb) are technically from the same nationality. Determining that the
victims in this case were "protected persons" who found themselves in the
hands of armed forces of a state of which they were not nationals, the Appeals
Chamber concluded that the Trial Chamber erred in acquitting Tadid of the
grave breach charges on the ground that the grave breaches regime was not
applicable. It thus reversed the not guilty verdicts of the seven grave breach
counts appealed.
Perhaps the most surprising articulation in this section is the suggestion in
footnote 113 that the four conditions set out in Article 4 of Geneva III for
determining the legitimacy of combatants "may now be considered to have been
replaced by the different conditions set out in Article 44(3) and 43(1) of
Additional Protocol I."
2. Insufficient Evidence as to the Killings in Jaskid
The second ground of cross-appeal by the OTP concerned the Trial
Chambers finding that there was insufficient evidence to establish that Tadid
had participated in the killings of five men in Jaskidi. In this regard, the
Prosecution complained that the Trial Chamber misapplied the standard of
proof of beyond a reasonable doubt, as the only reasonable conclusion that
could be drawn from the facts is that the Accused was guilty as charged.
Further, the OTP contended that in determining that the Prosecution did not
meet the burden of proof, the Trial Chamber misapplied the common purpose
doctrine, which essentially holds that "if a person knowingly participates in a
criminal activity with others, he or she will be liable for all illegal acts that are
natural and probable consequences of that common purpose" 9 After reviewing
the case law, the Appeals Chamber held that common design as a form of
accomplice liability is firmly established in customary international law and is
implicit in the Statute. It also determined that case law has demonstrated its
applicability to three distinct categories of cases. The actus reus of
participation in a common design requires: 1) a plurality of persons; 2) the
existence of a common plan, design, or purpose to commit a crime justiciable
under the Statute; and 3) participation of the Accused in this common design.
18. Id. at 168.
19. Id. at 175.
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The mens rea differs depending upon the category of common design under
consideration. In the Tadiecase, the Appeals Chamber concluded, based upon
the factual findings of the Trial Chamber, that Tadic had actively participated
in a common criminal purpose and that he actively took part in a common
criminal purpose to attack Jaskidi by rounding up and severely beating some of
the men from Jaskidi. As a result, the Appeals Chamber held that the only
possible conclusion the Trial Chamber could have drawn was that Tadid had the
intent to participate in the common criminal purpose to commit inhumane acts,
and willingly took the foreseeable risk that members of the group being
attacked might be killed during this attack. The Appeals Chamber therefore
held that the Trial Chamber erred in finding that it had not been proven beyond
a reasonable doubt that Tadid had any part in the killing of the five men from
Jaskici. Setting aside2" the Trial Chamber's not guilty verdict on these charges,
the Appeals Chamber found Tadid guilty in the death of these men.
3. Crimes Against Humanity - Purely Personal Motives
The third ground of cross-appeal by the OTP involved the Trial Chambers'
finding that crimes against humanity cannot be committed for purely personal
reasons. In order to convict an accused of crimes against humanity, the
Prosecution must prove the existence of an armed conflict and that there was
a sufficient nexus between the armed conflict and the acts alleged. After
reviewing Article 5 of the Statute and customary international law, the Appeals
Chamber concluded that the motive of the perpetrator does not acquire any
relevance for establishing evidence of crimes against humanity. It thus opined
that the requirement that an act must not have been carried out for purely
personal motives does not form part of the prerequisite elements necessary to
prove the commission of the crime.2
4. Crimes Against Humanity - Discriminatory Intent
The fourth ground of cross-appeal by the OTP concerned the Trial
Chamber's finding that all crimes against humanity require a discriminatory
intent. In interpreting the text of Article 5 of the Statute and surveying
customary international law, the Appeals Chamber determined that
discriminatory intent is not a required element of crimes against humanity. In
reviewing the Report of the Secretary-General and statements made by some
members of the Security Council concerning *Article 5 of the Statute, these
20. The Trial Chamber uses the terms "set aside" and "reverse" the verdict/judgment
interchangeably.
21. Prosecutor v. Du~ko Tadid, Judgement, IT-94-1 -A, July 15, 1999.
"interpretive sources" were deemed to be insufficient to establish that all crimes
against humanity need be committed with a discriminatory intent.22 Thus, the
Appeals Chamber held that the Trial Chamber erred in finding that all crimes
against humanity require a discriminatory intent.
It is unclear exactly how this part of the decision will affect the Rwanda
Tribunal, as the ICTR Statute's crimes against humanity provision differs in
significant terms from the crimes against humanity provision enumerated in the
ICTY Statute. Indeed, under the terms of Article 3 of the ICTR Statute, the
ICTR has the power to prosecute certain crimes, including murder, inhumane
acts, and "persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds," when these
crimes are committed "as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any
civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds."
Yet, this language may be interpreted narrowly as a result of paragraph 284 of
the Tadid Judgement of the Appeals Chamber, which states that because the
Yugoslavia Statute has a persecution subsection for crimes carried out "on
political, racial and religious grounds," to interpret the Statute and the law as
requiring that all crimes against humanity require discriminatory intent would
render the persecution subsection "illogical and superfluous" as the
presumption is that law-makers enact rules that are meaningful in all their
elements. Applying this analysis to Article 3 of the ICTR Statute would make
the chapeau of the Article in conflict with the remainder of the Article, which
too includes a persecution subsection. The Appeals Chamber notes that
supplemental means of interpretation can be resorted to when the text of an
instrument is unclear.23 Consequently, if the text of Article 3 of the ICTR
Statute is challenged and determined to be ambiguous due to its duplicative
persecutorial requirement which may render one or the other superfluous, then
turning to customary international law for guidance, and drawing on the Tadid
Judgement in this regard, it could conceivably be determined that Article 3 of
the ICTR Statute could be interpreted as not imposing a discriminatory intent
for all crimes against humanity.24
5. Disclosure of Defense Witness Statements
The fifth ground of cross-appeal by the OTP resulted from an earlier denial
of the Prosecution's motion for disclosure of a prior statement of a defense
witness after he had testified. The Prosecution maintained that this decision
remained persuasive authority for the proposition that the Defense cannot be
22. Id. at 1 293.
23. Id. at 1 303.
24. Id. at 1 292 (stating that customary international law "does not presuppose a discriminatory or
persecutory intent for all crimes against humanity.")
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ordered to disclose prior witness statements. Accordingly, the issue concerned
the power of a Trial Chamber to carry out its judicial functions while
conducting a fair and impartial trial, including the Trial Chamber's duty to
ascertain the credibility of witnesses. The Appeals Chamber opined that the
lawyer-client privilege does not cover Defense witness statements, and held
that, depending on circumstances of each case, a Trial Chamber may order the
disclosure of Defense witness statements after examination-in-chief of the
Witness.
C. Summary
In the TadidJudgement, the Appeals Chamber denied the two remaining
grounds of appeal sought by the Appellant/Defense. It allowed the OTP's
cross-appeals, and reversed the Trial Chamber's verdict as to the grave breach
charges appealed, and also reversed the Trial Chamber's determination that the
Accused had played no part in the killing of five men from the village of
Jaskidi. The Appeals Chamber further determined that a crime against
humanity can be carried out for purely personal motives and that discriminatory
intent is not required for all crimes against humanity, only for the persecution
crimes covered by Article 5(h) of the Statute. Finally, it held that depending on
the facts of each case, a Trial Chamber may order the disclosure of Defense
witness statements after examination-in-chief of the witness.
Because the Appeals Chamber denied Tadid's appeal on all counts, and
allowed and reversed as to each of the Prosecution's cross-appeals, it resulted
in Tadid being found guilty on nine additional charges. This of course means
that the Appeals Chamber found the accused, Tadid, guilty on nine counts for
which the Trial Chamber had previously found him not guilty. The
consequences of such a determination are currently unknown, as the new
convictions have apparently not been challenged by appeal. In the ICTY
Statute, Article 24 only provides for an appeal "from persons convicted by the
Trial Chambers" - it does not explicitly provide for an appeal for a person
convicted by the Appeals Chamber. Thus, it is unclear whether there is an
absolute denial of any right of appeal from an Appeals Chamber. Yet, because
Tadid was found guilty of nine counts for the first time, it could be argued that
he has a right to appeal these convictions, despite the fact that they were
imposed by the Appeals Chamber.' If such a right is asserted and found, the
appeal would clearly need to be heard by a differently constituted Appeals
Chamber. As noted by the Appeals Chamber in the Tadid Interlocutory Appeal
25. Prosecutor v. Dugko Tadid, Judgement, IT-94-I-A. July 15, 1999.
on Jurisdiction, narrowly interpreting the jurisdiction of the Appeals Chamber
"falls foul of a modem vision of the administration of justice. '2 6
In addition to the aforementioned appeals, the Defense also filed an appeal
against the Sentencing Judgement imposed by the Trial Chamber. However,
because Tadic was convicted on nine additional counts by the Appeals
Chamber, this portion of the appeal was deferred until the Appeals Chamber
sentences Tadid on the new convictions.
111. 1999 ICTY TRIAL CHAMBER JUDGMENTS
A. Aleksovski Judgement
The Indictment against Zlatko Aleksovski was issued on November 2,
1995, confirmed on November 10, 1995, and he was arrested on June 8, 1996
by the Croatian police acting pursuant to an arrest warrant issued by the
Tribunal. He spent ten months and twenty days in detention in the Republic of
Croatia before being transferred to the ICTY Detention Center in The Hague
on April 28, 1997. The trial began on January 6, 1998 and ended on March 23,
1999. The judgment was pronounced orally on May 7, 1999, and the written
decision rendered on June 25, 1999. The oral judgment was announced before
the written judgment was completed because Aleksovski's detention time
exceeded the sentence imposed by the Trial Chamber. Aleksovski was
sentenced to a mere two and one half years' imprisonment for the one count on
which he was found guilty and as his total detention time amounted to two
years, ten months, and twenty-nine days, he was ordered immediately released,
notwithstanding any appeal.
The Aleksovski trial was heard by Trial Chamber I. The Indictment
charged Aleksovski, commander/warden of Kaonik prison, with three counts:
Article 2 of the Statute, grave breaches (inhuman treatment; and wilfully
causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health); and Article 3 of the
Statute, violations of the laws or customs of war (outrages upon personal
dignity.) The Indictment alleged that during a six month period in 1993,
hundreds of Bosnian Muslim civilians were detained under Aleksovski's
custody in Kaonik prison. Additionally, during this time the detainees "under
his control" were subjected to deplorable conditions in the prison and to various
forms of physical and psychological mistreatment within and outside the prison,
including physical and psychological abuse leading to death. Aleksovski was
charged under 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute for individual criminal responsibility
for his implicit and explicit participation in the offences alleged and for his
26. Prosecutor v. Dufko Tadic, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction, IT-94-1-AR72, Oct. 2, 1995, App. Ch. at 16.
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responsibility as a superior for the acts committed by military or civilian
persons under his authority and control.
In its Judgement, the Trial Chamber noted that Articles 2 and 3 of the
Statute apply only when the offences alleged are committed in the context of
an armed conflict and with a sufficient nexus between the offence and the
armed conflict. The nexus requirement was interpreted to mean that the act was
perpetrated against the victim "because" of the conflict.27 The Trial Chamber
noted that it was not disputed that an armed conflict existed. However, because
under traditional interpretations of Article 2 (the grave breach provisions) the
armed conflict must be international in character, the Trial Chamber was unable
to agree on the applicability of Article 2 as to the facts established at trial. The
majority concluded that the victims were not "protected persons", a status
which is required to incur criminal liability for violating the grave breach
provisions of the Geneva Conventions. As such, Aleksovski was found not
guilty on the two grave breach counts, without the Trial Chamber examining
whether the offences alleged amounted to grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions. This acquittal could be in jeopardy as a result of the Appeals
Chamber holding in the TadidJudgement, discussed above.
The remaining count, alleging violations of Article 3 of the Statute,
charged as a serious violation of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
under the proscription of committing outrages upon personal dignity, was then
considered by the Trial Chamber after it reached general conclusions as to the
Accused's behavior, position, authority over, and responsibility for conditions
and mistreatment within and outside Kaonik prison.
As to incurring 7(1) liability, an Accused can be held responsible not only
for crimes they perpetrate physically, but also for "crimes committed by others
which [the Accused] is said to have personally ordered, instigated or otherwise
aided and abetted."2 Participation may occur before, during, or after the act is
committed and need not be manifested through physical assistance, as moral
support, encouragement, and sometimes mere presence is sufficient to incur
liability if it has a significant effect on the commission of the crime.29 As to
incurring 7(3) liability, the Trial Chamber acknowledged that an Accused can
be held criminally responsible for failing to take steps to halt, prevent, or punish
crimes committed by subordinates, when there is a means and a legal duty to do
so. "Superior responsibility", used to capture both doctrines of command
responsibility (usually attributed to military authorities) and superior authority
(usually attributed to political/civilian leaders), may be ascribed to an Accused
27. Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Judgement, IT-95-14/1-T, June 25, 1999.
28. Id. at 1 59.
29. Id. at 719 62-64.
if (i) there exists a defacto or dejure superior-subordinate relationship between
the Accused and the perpetrator; (ii) the superior knew or had reason to know
a crime had been committed or was about to be committed; and (iii) the
superior failed to take all the necessary and reasonable measures under the
circumstances existing at the time to prevent or halt the crime or to punish the
perpetrator.
Under facts established at trial, the Trial Chamber found Aleksovski
responsible under both 7(1) and 7(3) theories of responsibility for his
participation, through acts or behavior, for crimes committed within the Kaonik
prison compound. It also held that he aided and abetted in the use of detainees
as human shields or trenchdiggers, incurring 7(1) responsibility. In regards to
7(3) liability, the Trial Chamber found a superior-subordinate relationship over
prison guards sufficiently established, but not such relationship over HVO
soldiers. It held that the Accused could not be held responsible for crimes
committed outside the Kaonik prison compound. It remains unclear whether
Aleksovski was, as warden/commander of Kaonik prison, a civilian or military
leader.
The Trial Chamber then turned to Aleksovski's responsibility under 7(1)
for crimes committed within Kaonik prison, either physically by the Accused,
or by ordering, instigating or otherwise aiding and abetting in the crimes, and
under 7(3) for crimes committed by persons under his control and authority.
For 7(1) responsibility, the Trial Chamber considered it proven beyond a
reasonable doubt that Aleksovski was responsible for the detention conditions
in Kaonik prison, and that it was his duty to see to the hygiene, health, and
welfare of the detainees. However, the Trial Chamber held that while the
conditions were extremely poor and clearly did not meet international human
rights standards, it had not been adequately proven that the Accused failed to
take measures incumbent upon and available to him or that he deliberately
ordered or allowed the conditions to arise.3 °
As to the physical and psychological abuse, the Trial Chamber found it
sufficiently proved that in some instances the Accused aided and abetted in
mistreatment by means of verbal or expressive encouragement or by silence
when it was his duty to oppose or repress the acts; at times he physically
participated in physical violence; other times he ordered the beating and other
mistreatment of detainees.31 Consequently, the Trial Chamber found that the
violence inflicted within the Kaonik prison, both individually and by persons
under his authority, constituted an outrage upon personal dignity, in particular
humiliating and degrading treatment within the meaning of Common Article 3,
30. !d. at 1221.
31. Id. at j 86-89.
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as justiciable under Article 3 of the Statute for individual criminal
responsibility under Articles 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute. Further, the use of
detainees as human shields or trench-diggers was also held to constitute an
outrage upon personal dignity. Aleksovski was held responsible under 7(1) for
aiding and abetting in these crimes.
Perhaps the most surprising part of the Aleksovski Judgement is the
stunningly low sentence imposed for the conviction. Aleksovski was found
guilty of one count for violations of the laws or customs of war under two
theories of responsibility, which established the culpability of the Accused for
the physical and emotional violence inflicted on detainees in Kaonik prison.
As noted above, in pronouncing its sentence, the Trial Chamber imposed two
and a half years' of imprisonment, which exceeded the amount of time
Aleksovski had already been in detention, so he was immediately released.
While brought under one count, and convicted of only one count, the outrages
upon personal dignity charge consisted not of a single crime, but a course of
conduct comprising a series of heinous crimes committed by Aleksovski and by
persons under his authority against a large number of individuals.
Judge Rodrigues attached a dissenting opinion as to the applicability of the
grave breach provisions, determining that the international character of the
conflict was indeed established, even though it was his opinion that such
characterization of the conflict is not a condition prerequisite before Article 2
of the Statute can be applied. The majority, Judges Vohrah and Nieto-Navia,
also attached a joint opinion on the applicability of Article 2 of the Statute,
explaining its finding that the victims were not "protected persons" within the
meaning of Article 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which enunciates the
persons and property protected by the grave breach regime. The majority
concluded that to be a protected person, the civilian victim must hold a
nationality different from that of the captors/perpetrators.32 The majority found
that the detainees (Bosnian Muslims) held the same nationality as their captors
(Bosnian Croats, who may or may not have held a dual nationality as
Croatian).33 However, as discussed above, a contrary determination was made
by the Appeals Chamber in the TadidJudgement Also note that although not
considering the merits of the grave breach charges because the prerequisite
elements were deemed not to have been satisfied, the Trial Chamber considered
that the violence inflicted on the Muslim detainees of Kaonik prison constituted
"a grave violation of the principles of international humanitarian law arising
32. Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Judgement, rr-95-14/1-T, June 25, 1999.
33. Id. at 71 32-34.
from the Geneva Conventions", language which indicates it might constitute a
grave breach if an international armed conflict were found.'
B. The JelisidJudgement
On October 19, 1999, Trial Chamber I rendered its Judgement against
Goran Jelisid. This case represents the first genocide trial to be held in the
ICTY. Jelisid, who called himself the "Serb Adolf," was charged in the
Indictment with one count of genocide, twelve counts of violations of the laws
or customs of war for murder, three counts of violations of the laws or customs
of war for cruel treatment, one count of violations of the laws or customs of war
for plunder, twelve counts of crimes against humanity for murder, and three
counts of crimes against humanity for inhumane acts. The Indictment alleged
Jelisid's participation in crimes committed against Muslims and Croats at the
Luka camp in northern Bosnia, where he "held a position." He was charged
exclusively under 7(1). In October 1998, Jelisid pleaded not guilty to the
genocide charge, but guilty to the thirty-one remaining charges of crimes
against humanity and war crimes. Trial on the one count of genocide, which
alleged that the Accused committed or aided and abetted in killing members of
the group, ended in acquittal in a Judgement announced on October 19, 1999.
According to the press release, the Trial Chamber found that the OTP failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Jelisid acted with the requisite intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, the Bosnian Muslim population as a national,
ethnic or religious group, or that he had "the clear knowledge that he was
participating in genocide, that is to say the destruction, at least in part, of a
given group." Nonetheless, the acquittal appears to based primarily on a
finding that the OTP had failed to establish that genocide had been committed
in the region, and it therefore had difficulty finding the Accused guilty of
genocide. The Trial Chamber also appeared to take into account the fairly low
status of Jelisid, and the language of the Judgement indicates there was some
hesitation to find a low level actor guilty of genocide, particularly when it was
not firmly established that genocide had been committed in the region.
As to the guilty plea on the thirty-one counts of war crimes and crimes
against humanity, pursuant to Article 62 bis of the ICTY Rules of Procedure
and Evidence, the Trial Chamber must be satisfied that the guilty plea is
voluntary, informed, unequivocal, and that "there is a sufficient factual basis for
the crime and the accused's participation in it." The Trial Chamber determined
that the evidence established there was no doubt that Jelisid committed the
crimes he admitted, and it agreed with the Prosecutor's legal qualification of the
34. Id. at '1228.
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crimes as constituting crimes against humanity and violations of the laws or
customs of war. He was sentenced to 40 years' imprisonment.
IV. 1999 ICTR TRIAL CHAMBER JUDGMENTS
A. Serushago Sentence
On September 24, 1998, the Indictment against Omar Serushago, alleging
six counts of violations of Articles 2 and 3 of the ICTR Statute, was filed by the
OTP, but only five of these counts were confirmed by Judge Ostrovsky, who
dismissed one count of the Indictment. The remaining counts alleged one count
of genocide, and four counts of crimes against humanity for murder,
extermination, torture, and rape.
On December 14, 1998, Serushago pleaded guilty to four of the five counts
of the modified Indictment; he pleaded not guilty to the rape count.
Subsequently, the rape charge was withdrawn by the OTP.3 5 In reviewing the
charges and the acknowledgement of the Accused of his culpability for the
crimes, and after considering the case on its merits and general principles
regarding the determination of sentences, Trial Chamber I rendered its
Judgement on February 5, 1999.
Considering the gravity of the offences, including Serushago's guilt for
genocide, regarded as the "crime of crimes," and the fact that the Accused
personally murdered four Tutsi and that thirty-three other people were killed by
militia under his authority, the Trial Chamber noted that he committed these
crimes knowingly and with premeditation. In considering mitigating factors,
the Trial Chamber noted the youth, family, and social background of the
Accused, and particularly stressed that Serushago cooperated with the Office
of the Prosecutor, he voluntarily surrendered, he entered a guilty plea, and had
expressed remorse and contrition. It concluded that exceptional mitigating
circumstances afforded him some clemency. As such, Serushago was sentenced
to a single term of fifteen years' imprisonment.
B. Kayishema & Ruzindana Judgement
On May 21, 1999, after the joint trial of Clement Kayishema and Obed
Ruzindana, Trial Chamber II of the ICTR rendered the Rwanda Tribunal's
second judgment after a trial on the merits. The trial against Kayishema, the
Prefect of Kibuye Prefecture, and Ruzindana, a commercial businessman in
Kigali, began on April 11, 1997 and adjourned on November 17, 1998. The
35. See short discussion in Kelly D. Askin, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Its
Treatment of Crimes Against Women, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: ORIGINS, CHALLENGES &
PROSPECTS (John Carey & John Pritchard eds., vol. I1, 2000).
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Accused, both Hutu, were charged under Articles 2-4 of the Statute with
genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of Common Article 3 and
Additional Protocol II. These charges were also brought pursuant to Articles
6(1) and 6(3) of the ICTR Statute, which grants the Tribunal jurisdiction to
prosecute persons responsible for individual and superior criminal
responsibility.
Kayishema alone was charged under counts one through six with genocide
(genocide,' without specificity as regards to acts of Art.2(2)(a)-(e) of the
Statute), crimes against humanity (murder, extermination, and other inhumane
acts), and violations of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II (violence
to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder
as well, as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal
punishment) for a massacre at a Catholic Church and Home in St. Jean. He was
charged identically under counts seven through twelve for a massacre at a
Stadium in Kibuye Town. Kayishema was again charged with these same
crimes and acts under counts thirteen through eighteen for a massacre at a
Church in Mubuga. Counts nineteen through twenty-four charge both
Kayishema and Ruzindana with these identical crimes and acts, for alleged
massacres committed in the area of Bisesero.
1. Genocide
The Trial Chamber noted that before an Accused can be held responsible
for genocide, it must be proven that the Accused had the intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a racial, ethnic, religious, or national group by committing one
of the specified prohibited acts. The Trial Chamber focused primarily upon the
prohibited acts of killing and/or causing serious bodily harm to members of a
group, and determined that both Kayishema and Ruzindana, did intend to
destroy the Tutsi group by means of killing or seriously injuring them. As to
the massacres at the Complex and Stadium, Kayishema was held to have
instigated; ordered, committed, or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning,
preparation, and execution of genocide by killing and causing serious bodily
harm to Tutsis; as to the massacre at the Church, Kayishema was held to have
intended to have aided and abetted the preparation and execution of the
massacres. Both Kayishema and Ruzindana were held to have instigated,
ordered, committed, and otherwise aided and abetted in the preparation and
execution of the massacre of Tutsis in the Bisesero area.
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2. Crimes Against Humanity
Enunciating the elements of murder, the Trial Chamber held that an
Accused can be held accountable if, when engaging in unlawful conduct, s/he
(i) causes the death of another; (ii) by a premeditated act or omission; (iii)
intending to kill any person or intending to cause grievous bodily harm to any
person.36 Articulating the elements of extermination, the Trial Chamber held
that an Accused can be held accountable for participating in the mass killing of
others or in creating conditions of life that lead to the mass killing of others
through acts or omissions, for having intended the killing, or being reckless, or
grossly negligent as to whether the killing would result and, for being aware
that their acts or omissions form part of a mass killing event, if the acts or
omissions form part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian
population on national, political, ethnic, racial, or religious grounds.3 7 Elements
of other inhumane acts as a crime against humanity were stipulated as follows:
the Accused must (i) commit an act of similar gravity and seriousness to the
other acts enumerated in the Statute; (ii) with the intention to cause the other
inhumane act (whether against a victim or witness); and (iii) with knowledge
that the act is perpetrated within the overall context of the attack.3"
3. Violations of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II
In order for an act to breach Common Article 3 and Protocol II, the Trial
Chamber stated that the following elements must be established: (i) that the
armed conflict in Rwanda during this period was of a non-international
character; (ii) there is a link between the Accused and the armed forces; (iii) the
crimes must be committed ratione loci and ratione personae; and (iv) there
must be a nexus between the crime and the armed conflict.39 This Trial
Chamber thus concurs with the Akayesu Trial Chamber's restrictive
interpretation that serious violations of Common Article 3 are only justiciable
when committed by persons acting in furtherance of the war effort.'
36. Prosecutor v. Clement Kayishema & Obed Ruzindana, Judgement, ICTR-95-1-T, 140, May
21, 1999.
37. Id. atl 144.
38. Id. atj 154.
39. Id. at 169.
40. Id. at 175. It is also interesting that the Trial Chamber imposed a requirement of proof that
the conflict is internal, as the common Appeals Chamber held in the Tadid Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction Decision that Common Article 3 and most parts of Additional Protocol II are part of customary
international law, applicable to internal and international armed conflicts. See. Prosecutor v. Dulko Tadid
a/k/a "Dule," Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, IT-94- I-AR72, 2 Oct.




As to the first three massacre sites, of which solely Kayishema is charged,
the evidence established that thousands of Tutsis seeking refuge from various
communes fled to each of these sites, historically regarded as safe havens, to
escape atrocities perpetrated by the Hutus throughout Kibuye Prefecture. At
each of these sites, gendarmes under Kayishema's authority and control
guarded the entrances and prevented Tutsis from leaving. Conditions inside the
sites became desperate, as food, water, and other supplies were neither provided
nor allowed. During a five day period, the tens of thousands of Tutsi
imprisoned at these sites were systematically slaughtered; only a handful
survived. It was not disputed that the massacres occurred. The issue was
whether Kayishema incurred criminal liability by means of his presence, acts,
omissions, words, or authority. The Trial Chamber deemed it proved beyond
a reasonable doubt that Kayishema was present at each of the massacres, and
participated in the attacks by such means as encouraging, ordering, instigating,
inciting, or otherwise aiding and abetting in the attacks.
As to the charges against Kayishema and Ruzindana for massacres in the
area of Bisesero, the evidence established a series of massive, organized attacks
by Hutu against Tutsi during which thousands of Tutsi civilians were
systematically slaughtered. The Trial Chamber was satisfied that Ruzindana
and Kayishema, acting on some occasions in concert and on other occasions
separately, personally attacked Tutsis seeking refuge in Bisesero, and by their
words or acts, further aided in the "mass murder" of these victims. Indeed, the
Trial Chamber held that both Accused orchestrated and directed many of the
massacres in Bisesero.
In reaching its verdict, the Trial Chamber found both Accused guilty of
each genocide count charged against them. However, they were found not
guilty as to each crimes against humanity, Common Article 3, and Additional
Protocol II charge. A majority of the Trial Chamber held that as to counts
charging the Accused with crimes against humanity by means of extermination
and murder, these crimes were, under the facts of this case, "fully subsumed"
by the genocide crimes. It is important to emphasize that the judgment did not
hold that crimes against humanity are always subsumed within genocide. It was
the particular facts of this case - the same acts (murder, extermination)
committed against the same victims - that caused a majority of the Trial
Chamber to reach this conclusion. Judge Kahn however dissented on this point,
pointing out that in the practice of the Tribunals this issue is dealt with in the
sentencing phase (by imposing concurrent sentences when found guilty of the
same act under different Articles of the Statute), not in the guilt phase.
The Trial Chamber unanimously held that the Accused were not guilty of
committing inhumane acts as a crime against humanity. While the Trial
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Chamber noted that the Accused did indeed commit inhumane acts as a crime
against humanity, it rejected the use of "inhumane acts" as a "catch all"
category of crimes, and determined that because the OTP, while generally
alleging and referring to widespread violence, mutilation, and abuse, did not
specifically identify precisely which inhumane acts were being prosecuted and
did not adequately particularize which pieces of evidence supported these
charges, it found the Accused not guilty on these counts." The not guilty
verdicts as to the Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II counts were
made based on determinations that the Prosecution did not prove that the
Accused, both civilians, were supporting the Government efforts against the
RPF (the standard seemingly erroneously adopted in Akayesu), and that
therefore the Accused did not incur criminal liability for their crimes under
Article 4 of the Statute.42
In conclusion, four guilty verdicts were rendered against Kayishema on the
genocide counts, although he was then held to be not guilty on four crimes
against humanity counts, four violations of Common Article 3 counts, and four
violation of Protocol II counts. One guilty verdict was rendered against
Ruzindana on the genocide count, and he was similarly acquitted on one count
each alleging crimes against humanity, violations of Common Article 3, and
violations of Additional Protocol II. Kayishema was sentenced to life
imprisonment, and Ruzindana was sentenced to twenty-five years'
imprisonment.
C. Rutaganda Judgement43
On December 6, 1999, Trial Chamber I rendered its Judgement against
Georges Rutaganda, a prominent businessman and second vice-president of the
Interahamwe on the national level, for crimes committed during April 1994 at
the outbreak of the genocide. Rutaganda was deemed to have ordered, incited,
and carried out murders and to have caused serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the Tutsi ethnic group, by such means as distributing firearms and
other weapons to Interahamwe members and by taking part in attacks in
Kicukiro and Nyanza, during which hundreds of Tutsis were massacred.
41. Prosecutorv. Clement Kayishema & Obed Ruzindana, Judgement, ICTR-95-1 -T, May 21, 1999.
42. Id. at 1618, 624.
43. Please note that because this judgment was rendered after this article was written, it is not given
extensive treatment here.
Rutaganda was convicted of one count of genocide" and two counts of
crimes against humanity for extermination and murder. The Indictment had
charged Rutaganda with one count of genocide, four counts of crimes against
humanity (one count for extermination, three counts for murder), and three
counts of violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions (all
brought as murder charges). Thus, while convicted on three counts, he was
found not guilty on five counts, with the two counts of crimes against humanity
considered subsumed within the genocide conviction, and the three Article 4
charges (for violations of Common Article 3) deemed to have been
insufficiently proven.
The reasoning for the not-guilty verdicts for two of the crime against
humanity charges for murder are explained as being a lesser included offence
of extermination as a crime against humanity, and therefore an Accused cannot
be held criminally responsible for both extermination and murder on the basis
of the same act.45 However, he was also convicted on one count of murder as
a crime against humanity for the slaying of a specifically named individual
whom Rutaganda killed with a machete. In regards to the acquittals for all
Common Article 3 charges, even though the Trial Chamber found the existence
of an internal armed conflict and a nexus between the armed conflict and the
crimes committed by the Interahamwe militia, it nevertheless unconvincingly
determined that it had not been adequately established that a nexus existed
between the criminal culpability of the Accused and the armed conflict.46
Rutaganda was sentenced concurrently to life imprisonment for the
genocide conviction, life imprisonment for the crime against humanity
(extermination) conviction, and fifteen years' imprisonment for the crime
against humanity (murder) conviction.
As of December 31, 1999, not a single person has been convicted in the
ICTR of war crimes (the charges brought under Common Article 3 and
Additional Protocol II for crimes committed in internal armed conflicts).
44. In this judgment, it is also interesting to note that crimes of sexual violence appear to be
subsumed within the genocide verdict, even though sexual violence was not specifically charged in the
indictment. For instance, in the section on Legal Findings for genocide, the Trial Chamber held: "Some
young girls were singled out, taken aside and raped before being killed. Many of the women who were killed
were stripped of their clothing. The soldiers then ordered the Interalramwe to check for survivors and to
finish them off. The Accused directed the Interahamwe ... The Chamber finds that is has been established
beyond any reasonable doubt that the Accused was present and participated in the Nyanza attack.
Furthermore, it holds that by his presence, the Accused abetted in the perpetration of the crimes." Prosecutor
v. Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda, Judgement, ICTR-96-3-T, 1417, Dec. 6, 1999.
45. Prosecutor v. Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda, Judgement, ICTR-96-3-T, § §5.3-5.4,
Dec. 6, 1999.
46. See id. at §5.6.
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